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LUDWIK A. TECLAFF

Beyond Restoration-The Case of
Ecocide
ABSTRACT
The term "ecocide" was first coined to categorize massive destruction
of the environment in war. If the sheer scale of the harm done be the
distinguishingfeature of ecocide, it is contended that the term may
justifiably be applied to peacetime activities that destroy or damage
ecosystems on a massive scale. The author shows that, although
ecocide has a long history, it had little impact on internationallaw
until the advent of catastrophicoil spills at sea, nuclearaccidents,
long-range air pollution, and the threat of global warming. Then the
internationalcommunity began to demonstrate a growing concern,
but the measures undertaken in response may already be too little
and too late. The concluding part of the articledeals with the more
radical legal remedies (such as treating ecocide as an international
crime) that may be needed to avert the threat of ecocide.
INTRODUCTION
The term "ecocide" was first coined some two decades ago to
categorize massive destruction of the environment in war and, specifically, the use of defoliants in southeast Asia.1 The word may be new, but
the tactics are as old as history. They have been employed by defenders
to deny attackers food, water or shelter, or by attackers to induce
defenders to surrender, or as a counter-insurgency measure, to quell
stubborn rebellion.2 What characterizes such activities in the modern

* Ludwik A. Teclaff is Professor of Law Emeritus at Fordhan University School of Law.

1. Random House Dictionary of the English Language 618 (2d ed. 1987) (gives the origin
of the term as American). See Falk, Environmental Warfare and Ecocide: Facts, Appraisal and

Proposals, 9 Revue beige de Droit International 1 (1973); Gormley, Human Rights and
Environment: The Need for International Cooperation 14-15 (1976); Ehrlich et al., Ecoscience:
Population, Resources, Environment 653 (1977); Nietschmann, Battlefields of Ashes and Mud,
Natural History, Nov. 1990, at 35.

2. Nietschmann points out that vegetation destruction is a tactic that has been used by
governments around the world to deal with insurgency, for excample, by Ethiopian
occupation forces in Tigray and Eritrea; by both Myanmar (Burma) troops and resistance
forces in the Shan and Karen forests; and by Bangladesh against insurgents in the
Chittagong Hill Tracts. Nietschmann, supra note 1, at 36. As for scorched-earth tactics,

Herodotus, in 447 B.C. described how the Scythians, retreating before the Persian army
under Darius, destroyed all that grew on the ground. Herodotus, History 240 (Komroff ed.
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world is the sheer scale of the damage done to the environment. If this
be the distinguishing feature of ecocide, then it is contended that the term
may justifiably be applied to peacetime activities that destroy or damage
ecosystems on a massive scale.3
The ecosystem so destroyed or damaged would normally be
large. It might be that of a major river, an enclosed sea, a mountain
range, an aquifer, or a tract of forest, wetland, or other terrain of
distinctive vegetation or soil type. The consequences of its impairment
may spread to an entire large region, even the globe itself, and, hence, be
disastrous for the welfare of many other ecosystems in a chain reaction.
In many instances, the damage would be such that it cannot be undone
and the ecosystem is beyond repair. Damage of this kind may be the
result of a single nuclear disaster or the cumulative effect of unchecked
toxic pollution. In fact, the end result of uncontrolled pollution could
make the earth unfit for human life--an ultimate ecocide.
Because repair may be not enough to undo the damage, this
article will attempt to sketch how nations have coped with ecocide. It will
show that, although ecocide has a long history, it had little impact on
international law until the advent of catastrophic oil spills at sea, nuclear
accidents, and long-range air pollution. Then the international community
began to demonstrate a growing concern, but the measures undertaken
in response may already be too little and too late. The concluding part
will deal with the more radical legal remedies that may be needed to
avert threatening disaster.
THE RISE OF ECOCIDE
Ecocide began when human beings learned to adapt the natural
environment to their needs. Even primitive societies were quite capable
of methodically and heedlessly misusing their resources, generation after
generation, until the bruised and battered environment would no longer
support them. Who would imagine today that barren Easter Island in the
Pacific once supported a lush vegetation? It seems that the inhabitants
committed ecocide in two time-honored ways, first by fire and then by

& Rawlinson trans., 1936). During the 100 Years War in Europe, roving companies of
ecorcheurs (literally "scorchers") wandered through France creating havoc by fire. I The Law

of War. A Documentary History 775 (Friedman ed. 1972). The most famous example in more
recent times was Sherman's "March to the Sea" through Georgia. See B. Catton, Never Call
Retreat 415 (1965); Commager, The Blue and the Grey: The Story of the Civil War as Told
by Participants 958-59 (1950).
3. That the term has already passed into general, non-military usage is suggested by the
dictionary definition: "The destruction of large areas of the natural environment by such
activity as nuclear warfare, overexploitation of resources or dumping of harmful chemicals."

Random House Dictionary, supra note 1, at 618 (emphasis added).
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over-grazing
until soil erosion forced them to abandon the island
4
altogether.
Fire was probably the earliest large-scale ecocidal force employed
the world over. In the beginning, its use was limited, but ancient hunters
and gatherers are believed to have purposefully started conflagrations to
open up areas for better hunting, and they were followed by farmers
whose preferred method of preparing fields for cultivation was to slash
and bum acres of forestI Soil erosion, from livestock grazing and
continuous cultivation, has plagued the semi-arid, hilly Mediterranean
region since remote antiquity. The barren wastelands so created were
observed with sorrow by Plato and other ancient writers.' Bare rock and
scrub-covered hillsides around the Mediterranean testify today to a
destruction of forests for lumber and shipbuilding that was noticeable
more than two and a half millennia ago.'
Failure to maintain irrigation systems and soil fertility under
irrigation proved to be the nemesis of many of the more advanced
agricultural societies from remote Sumerian times onward, because of soil
salinity which rendered parts of Mesopotamia, the Nile delta and, later,
semi-arid areas of the Indian sub-continent an alkali desert Migrating
pastoralists also brought about the downfall of both hydraulic and other
types of farming by damaging water installations and putting their sheep
to graze among the ruins. An irrigation system destroyed by nomads
implied not just a temporary dislocation, but the complete and permanent
replacement of an ecosystem supporting intensive agriculture by one
supporting only grassland and grazing animals.'
When European colonists reached the Americas, they altered and
even destroyed to suit their own purposes the ecosystems that supported
the economy of Indian tribes." In the process, buffalo disappeared from
4. See Browne, New FindingsReveal Ancient Abuse of Lands, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1987, at

Cl.
5. Stewart, Fireas the FirstGreat Force Employed by Man, in 1 Man's Role in Changing the
Face of the Earth 115 (1956) [hereinafter Man's Role].
6. Plato, Critias, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato 1212, 1216 (Hamilton & Cairns, eds.
1961).
7. Heichelheimn, Effects of ClassicalAntiquity on the Land, in Man's Role, supra note 5, at 165,
171; see also Cary, The Geographical Background of Greek and Roman History 22-23 (1949).
8. See Teclaff, Economic Roots of Oppression 23 (1984); Hamdan, Evolution of Irrigation
Agriculture in Egypt, in A History of Land Use in Arid Regions 119 (Stamp ed., 1961).
9. The Mongols wrought such devastation all around the periphery of dry Central Asia

in the 13th century, annihilating steppe-farming communities and reducing and weakening
oasis civilization. According to one authority, "the empty spaces of the Dry Belt were
terribly enlarged by the plague of nomadic migrations." Von wissman, On the Role of Nature
and Man in Changing the Face of the Dry Belt of Asia, in Man's Role, supra note 5, at 278, 296.
10. For a survey of recent studies on the transformation of North American ecosystems
since pre-Columbian times, see Stevens, The Heavy Hand of European Settlement, N.Y. Times,
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the prairies and passenger pigeons from the skies of North America, but
the continent now supports millions more people and at a higher
standard of living. Similarly, the much earlier disappearance of dense
forests and of wolves and bison in Europe 1 did not impede the capacity
of that continent's environment to support a greater number of people at
an ever-rising standard of living.
Ecocide brought destruction and suffering to many, but has not,
so far, impeded the multiplication and territorial expansion of the human
species. The story of humanity has been a story of success in continuously changing the natural environment (by ecocide, among other means)
into one more adaptable to the satisfaction of human needs. That is why,
even after the Industrial Revolution had accelerated capacity to inflict
damage on the environment, 1 there were still only a few who, like
George Perkins Marsh and Henry David Thoreau, 3 raised warning
voices about the pace and consequences of such transformations. By the
second half of the 20th century, however, the threat of ecocide began to
assume global dimensions and could no longer be ignored.
With nuclear weapons testing, the atmosphere could become a
conduit of long-lasting, perhaps permanent environmental damage to
large parts of the entire globe. 4 Devastating as some of these military
Aug. 10, 1993, at CL.On the deliberate destruction of wildlife as a device to undermine the
Indian economy in the West, see Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee: An Indian
History of the American West 265 n.18 (1970) (citing Garretson, The American Bison 128
(1938) and Hornaday, The Extermination of the American Bison 496-501 (1889)).
11. See Darby, The Clearingof the Woodland in Europe, in Man's Role, supra note 5, at 183.
12. So complete was the pollution of the English Midlands after little more than half a
century of heavy industry that Dickens was writing of a "Coketown" with its canals black
and its rivers purple with dye. Dickens, Hard Times 22 (New Oxford Illustrated Dickens ed.,
1955). Germany's Ruhr region followed the same pattern until its rivers became sewers and
its major cities were in danger of drowning in their own pollution. Fair, Pollution Abatement
in the Ruhr District,in Comparisons in Resource Management 156 (Jarrett ed., 1961). Even
the New World was getting into the same state. In 1871 an American court was obliged to
restrain a municipality from actually filling up a navigable waterway with rubbish and
sewage. Clark v. Peckham, 10 R.I. 35 (1871).
13. Marsh, Man and Nature (Lowenthal ed., 1965); Thoreau, Walden and Other Writings
(Atkinson ed., 1950).
14. See Lee, The Legality of Nuclear Tests and Weapons, 18 Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur
offentliches Recht 307 (1968). The warning and danger areas established for nuclear tests
and closed off to shipping and fishing give some idea of the extent of radioactive fallout.
In the Pacific atomic proving grounds of the United States, they amounted to 400,000 square
miles. Id. at 314 n.31. The zone around Christmas Island was 600 by 800 miles and around
Johnston Island it had a radius of 470 nautical miles at sea level. Id. From a single
detonation in 1954, the immediate, documented injury to humans included exposure to
radiation of a Japanese tuna trawlei's crew and more than 250 people on Kwajalein Island.
Id. at 312, 316 n.36. The effect of nuclear testing on ecosystems is more subtle and may last
a very long time. Radioactivity from Soviet testing decades ago continues to be a problem
in the Arctic because of its effects on the food chain. [Current Rep.) Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA)
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applications have been, the direct and indirect effects of non-military
development of nuclear power are no less threatening to the long-term
survival of life-sustaining ecosystems. Chernobyl demonstrated this in
alarming fashion,"5 and the disclosure of a group of unsafe reactors in
eastern Europe gives no grounds for confidence in the technology. 6
At the same time, the oceans have shown increasing signs of
stress-dramatically through tanker and oil-drilling accidents, silently and
insidiously through routine vessel operation, dumping of wastes at sea,
and land-based pollution entering the marine environment via rivers and
the atmosphere. From 1967, when the Torrey Canyon ran on the rocks off
Great Britain, 7 to 1978, when the Amoco Cadiz broke in half off the coast
of France,' to 1989, when the Exxon Valdez impaled itself on the rocks
of Prince William Sound, 9 the damage from oil spills escalated despite
all efforts at prevention and control. These were the most sensational
incidents, but in a single two-month period (December 1976-January
1977) there were no fewer than ten tanker casualties, among them the
Argo Merchant grounding off Nantucket Island, Massachusetts.' Some
of the accidents have been in environmentally very sensitive areas and
two such disasters happened in one year (1989)-the Exxon Valdez spill
near Alaskan wilderness areas and the grounding of the Argentine navy
ship Bahia Paraiso
close to wildlife breeding sites on Torgersen Island in
21
the Antarctic.
While this was going on, other parts of the aquatic environment
suffered devastating harm. The Aral Sea was found to have very largely
disappeared, losing 66 percent of its volume and dropping about 40 feet

43 (1991). No less deadly is the recently disclosed dumping of reactors from former Soviet
navy ships and leakage from a sunken nuclear submarine in Arctic waters. See [Current
Rep.) Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 85, 251,450 (1993).
15. Of the vast and growing literature on the effects of Chernobyl, see Sands, The
Environment, Community and InternationalLaw, 30 Harv. Int'l L.J. 393, 401-12 (1989). The
impact of the accident in April 1986 was much more widespread in Europe and the former
Soviet Union than was at first thought.
16. The problems with unsafe reactors in eastern Europe have only recently come to light.
The Greifswald plant in former East Germany was ordered dosed in 1990, but a number of
these Chernobyl-type reactors are still operating. [Current Rep.) Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 260,
321-22, 333, 364 (1993).
17. See Schneider, Pollution from Vessels, in The Environmental Law of the Sea 203
(Johnston ed., 1981).
18. Id. at 204; see also Jacobsen & Yellen, Oil Pollution: The London Protocols and the
AMOCO CADIZ, 15 J. Mar. L. & Com. 467 (1984).
19. See Crowley, In the Wake of the Exxon Valdez: Chartingthe Course of PilotageRegulation,
22 J. Mar. L. & Com. 165 (1991).
20. Schneider, supra note 17, at 204.
21. Environmental Defense Fund, Antarctic Oil Spill Highlights Need for Reform, 20 EDF
Letter. A Report to Members of the Environmental Defense Fund, May 1989, at 1, 5.
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since 1960, due to diversions for cotton irrigation in Soviet Central
Asia. Semi-enclosed seas, such as the Baltic, the North Sea and the
Black Sea, had become polluted sinks from the deposition of toxic waste
of all kinds.' Major rivers, such as the Rhine, the Danube, and the Elbe,
were little better than sewers." The ultimate insult to the Rhine was the
Sandoz fire of 1986 at Basel, Switzerland, which resulted in the release to
the river of huge quantities of toxic chemicals, threatening water supplies,
killing fish, and fouling the riverbed for hundreds of miles down to the
5
2

sea.

Rivers and lakes were also showing widespread damage from
acidification, and attention returned full circle to the atmosphere and the
problem of acid rain, which was by now afflicting not only the heavily
industrialized areas of Europe and North America, but also Latin
America and parts of the Far East.2 Among the other effects of acid
precipitation was forest damage. 'Waldsterben" (forest death) spread
alarmingly in Germany and central Europe in the 1980s, causing visible
deterioration to three-quarters of all trees in some areas.27 Forests in
eastern Europe, Scandinavia, the former USSR, the eastern states of the
United States and the eastern provinces of Canada were also badly
affected. '
Harm to the temperate forests in recent years has been overshadowed, however, by the rapid disappearance of enormous areas of tropical
forest. Despite a conservation plan to which 70 countries subscribed,
nearly twice as much forest was being liquidated at the end of the 1980s
22. Vice-President Albert Gore (then Senator, D. Tenn.) described this in 1990 as an

ecological disaster which has virtually passed beyond human control. [Current Rep.] Int'l
Envtl. Rep. 543 (1990); see also Kotlyakov, The Aral Sea Basin: A CriticalEnvironmental Zone,
33 Env't 4 (No. 1, 1991).
23. See Teclaff &Teclaff, Transfers of Pollution and the Marine Environment Conventions, 31
Nat. Res. J.187,188-94, 204 n.108 (1991); North Sea Protection: Insufficient Progress,20 Envtl.
Pol'y & L 85 (1990); Kindler & Lintner, An Action Plan to Clean Up the Baltic, 35 Env't 7 (No.

8,1993); Hey &Mee, Black Sm-The MinisterialDeclaration:An ImportantStep, 23 Envtl. Pol'y
&L. 215 (1993).
24. See Ercmann, Pan-EuropeanParliamentaryConference, 21 Envtl. Poly & L. 68,69 (1991);
International Rivers and Lakes: Newsletter of the U.N. Dept. of Technical Co-Operation for
Development, Nov. 1990, at 12, 13; Teclaff & Teclaff, Transboundary Toxic Pollution and the
DrainageBasin Concept, 25 Nat. Res. J.589 (1985).
25. On the Sandoz fire and its aftermath, see The Rhine: Sandoz Incident, [Current Rep.] Int'l

Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 429-41 (1986).
26. See Brunnee, Acid Rain and Ozone Layer Depletion: International Law and Regulation
11 (1988). The correlation between air pollution and acidity in rainfall was studied as long
ago as mid-19th century, but the problem was perceived mainly as a local one until Sweden
drew attention to it internationally in 1972. Id. at 9.
27. Id.at 18; see also EuropeanForests Still Severely Threatened by Air Pollution,Commission's
Report Says [Current Rep.] Int'l Envtl. Rep. 395 (1991).
28. Brunee, supra note 26, at 19.
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than at the beginning of the decade." Chief concern centered on the
Brazilian Amazon, which contains an estimated one-third of all remaining
tropical forest and much of Earth's biological diversity, and where an
area almost the size of Kansas was burned in one year alone."
Not least of the worries about the Amazon rain forest was the
effect of its destruction upon global climate. Once again, the overriding
problem-rather, two problems, the disappearing ozone layer and the
greenhouse effect-centered on the global commons. Ozone concentrations have shown a marked decline since the late 1970s, with holes
appearing over the polar regions and, recently, over Europe as well.31
The greenhouse effect is a more contentious subject, not easy to measure,
still less to forecast, but alarming in its implications.'
RESPONSE TO THE GROWING THREAT OF ECOCIDE
Prohibitions,Penalties, and Compensation
Although the threat of ecocide in the 20th century could not be
ignored, the international community's initial response was slow, gradual,
and not very effective. It was first articulated in connection with oil

29. The plan was the Tropical Forestry Action Plan (TFAP), initiated under United
Nations auspices in 1985. See Lohmann & Colchester, Paved With Good Intentions: TFAP's
Road to Oblivion, 20 Ecologist 91 (No. 3, 1990); DeterioratingTropical Forests, 20 Envtl. Pol'y
& L. 207-10 (1990).
30. See Smith et al., Conserving the Tropical Cornucopia,33 Env't (No. 6, 1991); Hildyard,
Adios Amazonia? A Report from the Altimira Gathering, 19 Ecologist 53 (No. 2, 1989).
31. Brunnee, supra note 26, at 42. The ozone hole over Antarctica reached its widest extent
(9.4 million sq. m.) in 1992; in 1993 it was nearly as large and the amount of ozone was the
lowest ever recorded anywhere in the world. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1993, at A23.
32. There is already an enormous literature on the greenhouse effect and global climate
change, and much debate and confusion about the kinds of projections and models used for
forecasting change. See, e.g., Kowalok, Common Threads: ResearchLessons from Acid Rain, Ozone
Depletion, and Global Warming, 35 Env't 12 (No. 6,1993); Glantz, The Use of Analogies in
ForecastingEcologicaland Societal Responses to Global Warming, 33 Env't 10,11 (No. 5,1991);
White, The GreatClimate Debate, Scientific American, July 1990, at 36; Schneider, Global
Warming (1989). On the potential effects of climate change on particular regions or resources,
see Hulme & Kelley, Exploring the Links Between Desertificationand Climate Change,35 Env't 4
(No. 6,1993); Parry, Climate Change and World Agriculture (1990); Hekstra, Global Warming
andRising Sea Levels: The PolicyImplications, 19 Ecologist 4 (No. 1,1989); Teclaff, The River Basin
Concept and Global Climate Change,8 Pace Envtl. L Rev. 355 (1991); Office of Policy, Planning
and Evaluation & Office of Research and Development, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, The Potential Effects of Global Climate Change in the United States: Report to
Congress (Smith & Tirpak eds., 1989); American Association for the Advancement of Science
Panel on Climatic Variability, Climate Change, & the Planning and Management of U.S. Water
Resources, Climate Change and U.S. Water Resources (Waggoner ed., 1990).
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pollution of the oceans which, in the 1920s, appeared to have vast powers
of recuperation. When oil replaced coal as fuel for ocean-going ships, the
sheen of an oil spill on the surface of the sea became a visible sign of

spreading pollution which might, in time, impede the use of the oceans.
To do something about this, a conference convened in 1926 produced a
draft convention permitting states to establish near their coasts zones
within which oil discharge would be severely limited.' Since oil
pollution was then still in its infancy, the matter was shelved for a while,
but the concept of zones took hold and was enacted in the 1954 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil.' In
a zone 50 miles from land, tankers were forbidden to discharge oil
altogether and to discharge oily mixtures containing more than 100 parts
per million of oil.3 As is evident, the Convention left most of the sea
unprotected and so the system of zones was extended outward generally
to 100 miles by amendments in 1962.1 It was the 1969 amendments
which aimed to extend protection to the entire ocean by de-emphasizing
the system of zones and introducing a rate of discharge per mile, which
tankers were not to exceed en route. 7
Though an improvement on the original convention, the 1969
amendments were still a long way from eliminating oil pollution.
Meanwhile, the Torrey Canyon spill had raised the specter of accidental

33. See Final Act of the Preliminary Conference on Oil Pollution of Navigable Waters,

Annex, art. I (1926), reprinted in I Foreign Rel. U.S. 238, 245 (1926).
34. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, May 12,

1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989 [hereinafter 1954 Convention].
35. 1954 Convention, supra note 34, art. lI(l)(a), (b) at 2993. Three years after entry into
force of the Convention, ships other than tankers were also to be subject to these discharge
limits. 1954 Convention, supra note 34, art. M1(2), at 2993.
36. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, Apr. 4-11,
1962,17 U.S.T. 1523 (1954 Convention Amended 1962). In addition, new ships, i., ships of

more than 20,000 tons begun after the effective date of the revision, were forbidden to
discharge oil and oily mixtures with an oil content higher than 100 ppm. even outside the
zones, except in special circumstances. Id. Annex A, para. 3, at 1526. Smaller. ships were
allowed to continue unrestricted discharge outside the zones.
37. Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil, Amendments to Convention of 1954, Oct.
21, 1969, art. Mll(a), 28 U.S.T. 1205, 1209-10, 9 I.L.M. 1, 3. For ships other than tankers
discharge was to be effected as far as possible from land and limited to a rate not more than
60 liters per mile and an oil content of 100 ppm. For tankers, discharge was forbidden
within 50 miles from land and beyond that the discharge was not to exceed 1/15,000th of
the total cargo-carrying capacity. Id. art. H1(b), at 1209, 9 I.LM. at 4.
38. "A discharge standard is, after all, essentially a license to pollute: its efficacy in
reducing pollution depends on accuracy of measurement and, perhaps more than any other
prevention means, on the capability of detecting infringements." Teclaff, Controlling
Operational Oil Pollution from Ships, in Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Annual
Proceedings, 477, 482 (1978).
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damage on a hitherto unheard-of scale.' Therefore, the 1973 Convention
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and its 1978 Protocol (collectively known as MARPOL 73/78)'"put the emphasis on preventive
measures by establishing construction and equipment requirements
designed to control both operational and accidental discharges.41
These conventions are penal in character. The 1954 Convention
imposed on member states an obligation to provide severe penalties for
oil discharge within the 50-mile prohibited zone.' However, it left
enforcement mostly in the hands of the flag state0 and coastal states
were accorded limited rights of inspection only when a foreign ship was
in their ports." MARPOL gave the port state the right to detain or deny
entry to a foreign ship which violates technical requirements,' but
stopped short of giving it the right to proceed against a foreign ship for
spills into sea areas outside its national jurisdiction.4 The 1958 Convention on the High Seas, which merely charges states with the obligation to
draw up regulations for preventing the main types of ocean pollution. 7
does not have penal provisions, but leaves enforcement to the flag
state.' On the other hand, the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention of
1982,* which deals extensively with pollution, considerably enhances
the enforcement powers of port and coastal states. According to LOS, a
state whose port an offending vessel enters may proceed against that ship
even if the discharges occurred on the high seas-i.e, outside the

39. See supra note 17.
40. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov. 2,1973,12
I.L.M. 1319 [hereinafter MARPOLI. MARPOL, supra, was incorporated, with modification,
into the Protocol of Feb. 17, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 546 (1978) (entered into force on Oct. 2, 1983)
[hereinafter MARPOL 73/78).

41. See MARPOL 73/78, supra note 40, Annex 1, at 550-63 (especially Regulations 13-20).
42. 1954 Convention, supra note 34, art. VI, at 2994-95.
43. Specifically charging that state to proceed against the owner or master of a flag-state

ship found to have caused pollution within a prohibited zone. 1954 Convention, supra note
34, art. X, at 2998.
44. 1954 Convention, supra note 34, art. IX, at 2996-98. This inspection was limited to
verification of the oil record book, and the coastal state could proceed against the violating
ship only for infringement of its laws in the territorial sea. 1954 Convention, supranote 34,
art. XI, at 2998.
45. MARPOL 73/78, supra note 40, art. 5(3), at 548.

46. The port state can proceed against a foreign ship for violations which have occurred
within areas under its jurisdiction, in accordance with prevailing rules of international law.

MARPOL 73/78, supra note 40, Annex 1, at 553-54; see Teclaff, supra note 38, at 488-91.
47. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 2319.
48. Id. art. 5, at 2315.
49. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 21 LL.M. 1261,
reprinted in The Law of the Sea: Official Text of the United Nations Convention on the Law

of the Sea with Annexes and Index (1983) [hereinafter LOS Convention).
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territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).s Furthermore, a
foreign vessel can be arrested while sailing in the territorial sea or
EEZ,51 and proceedings can be brought against that ship. In both cases,
proceedings have to be suspended at the request of the flag state, unless
there was major damage to the coastal state, or unless the flag state
repeatedly disregarded its enforcement obligationsPsa
None of the conventions discussed above addresses the question
of compensation for damage. This was done by the 1969 Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution from Ships (CLC).9 Since states were
reluctant to accept responsibility and liability directly, the Convention
made the tanker owner strictly liable for pollution damage, but put a cap
on that liability.54 The 1971 Fund Conventione established a special
fund to pay for excess losses not covered in the CLC. Both conventions
set the limits of liability too low and both have been repeatedly amended
by protocol to raise those limits, most recently in 1992.P Since the fund
was established by contributions from the oil interests;" total liability
under both conventions was split between the carriers and their insurers
and the shippers (cargo owners).
Both conventions provide compensation when damage occurs in
the territories, territorial seas, and exclusive economic zones of contracting states,' or, if a contracting state has not established an EEZ, to an
area extending not more than 200 nautical miles from the baseline of its
territorial sea.- Damage claims may be brought only in the courts of

50. LOS Convention, supra note 49, art. 218(1), at 1312.
51. LOS Convention, supra note 49, art. 220(6), at 1313.
52. LOS Convention, supra note 49, art. 228, at 1314.
53. Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution from Ships, Nov. 29, 1969,9 I.LM. 45.
54. Id. art. V, at 48-51.
55. International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 8, 1971, 11 1.1M. 284.
56. 1992 Protocol to the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 1969,
Nov. 27, 1992, [Reference File) Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 21:1501,1551, (July 1993) [hereinafter
CLC Consolidated Text); 1992 Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishment
of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage of 1971, Nov. 27,1992,
[Reference Filel Int'l Envtl. Rptr. (BNA) 21:1701, 1751 (July 1993) [hereinafter Fund
Consolidated Text]. The 1992 Protocols are not yet in force as of this writing. When they
have been ratified by a sufficient number of states, they will be read together with the two
Conventions to become two new instruments, the 1992 Liability Convention and the 1992
Fund Convention. See Wilkinson, Moving the Boundariesof CompensableEnvironmental Damage
Caused by Marine Oil Spills: The Effect of Two New InternationalProtocols, 5 J.Envtl. L. 71, 78
(1993).
57. Fund Consolidated Text, supra note 56, art. X, at 21:1704.
58. CLC Consolidated Text, supra note 56, art. IL at 21:1501; Fund Consolidated Text,
supra note 56, art. 3, at 21:1702.
59. CLC Consolidated Text, supranote 56, art. H(a)(ii), at 21:1501; Fund Consolidated Text,
supra note 56, art. 3 (a)ii), at 21:1702.
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member states in whose territory, territorial sea, or EEZ the damage
occurred or where preventive measures were taken.' The CLC and
Fund Conventions apply only to parties and have had to be supplemented on the part of shipping and oil interests by voluntary agreements
which can apply in jurisdictions where CLC is not in force.' These
voluntary agreements parallel the conventions, TOVALOP62 being
similar to the CLC in channeling liability to the ship owners, and
CRISTAL63 to the Fund in providing supplemental compensation when
liability exceeds the TOVALOP limits."
The conventions and arrangements for liability for oil pollution
damage apply only after the damage has occurred. They do not deal with
prevention. The 1969 Convention on Intervention on the High Seas
made some attempt to cope with that problem by empowering coastal
states to take immediate preventive measures, but only when an oil spill
threatened substantial damage to their coasts and coastal waters.' The
1990 Preparedness Convention,' also aims at prevention and minimization of future losses, but is broader in scope. It is addressed not only to
coastal states that are actually threatened, but also to all state parties
whose ships and offshore installations can cause pollution.' It charges
states with the duty of requiring their flag ships to have an oil pollution
emergency plan, as required by and in accordance with the provisions
adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IO),' and their
offshore facilities to have oil pollution emergency plans in accordance
with national emergency systems.70 States have a duty to establish a

60. CLC Consolidated Text, supra note 56, art. IX(l), at 21:1504; Fund Consolidated Text,
supra note 56, art. 7(l), at 21:1703.
61. See Cohen, Revisions of TOVALOP and CRISTAL- Strong Ships for Stormy Seas, 18 J.
Mar. L & Com. 525, 526 (1987).
62. Tankers Owners Voluntary Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution
(TOVALOP), Jan. 7, 1969, 8 IL.M. 497.
63. Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution
(CRISTAL), Jan. 14, 1971, 10 I.L.M. 137.
64. Both agreements have since been revised as to limits of liability and geographical
application. See Cohen, supranote 61, at 529-37. For a description and analysis of the original
TOVALOP and CRISTAL, see Becker, A Short Cruise on the Good Ships TOVALOP and
CRISTAL, 5 J. Mar. L & Com. 609 (1974).
65. International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil
Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969,26 U.S.T. 765,9 I.L.M. 25.
66. Id. art. I, at 767-68, 9 LL.M. at 25-26.
67. International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation,
Nov. 30, 1990,30 IL.M. 735.
68. Id. art. 1, at 736.
69. Id. art. 3(a), at 737.
70. Id.
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national emergency system as detailed in the Convention.' They also
have a duty to cooperate in response to oil pollution incidents when the
severity of such incident so justifies, upon request of any party affected
or likely to be affected,' as well as in research and development, 3 and
in providing support for those parties which request technical assistance.74
While oil spills have caused spectacular incidents of ecocide, the
potential for damage inherent in nuclear ship operations is many times
greater." To take account of this, the Nuclear Ships Convention was
adopted in 1962,76 defining the liability for damage from pollution of the
marine environment by nuclear materials. The Convention also confines
liability to the operator of the nuclear ship and makes it absolute, which
means that the operator cannot be relieved from liability even if the
incident was caused by an act of God. 7 The operator is required to
maintain insurance or other financial security covering his liability
(which, though absolute, is limited), and if this proves to be inadequate,
the licensing state is obliged to ensure that claims be paid." Jurisdiction
over claims for damage is confined either to the courts of the licensing
state or the state in whose territory nuclear injury has been sustained.'
Nuclear ships are only one potential cause of radioactive
pollution. Nuclear installations are another, and the Nuclear Damage
Convention of 1963 deals with liability for what may be devastating harm
to ecosystems.' It makes the operator liable for damage caused by a
nuclear incident in the installation, or originating in the installation and
occurring elsewhere," except when the damage is caused by a nuclear
incident directly due to an act of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or
insurrection, or (except insofar as the law of the installation state may
provide to the contrary) is directly due to a grave natural disaster of an
exceptional character.' The liability may be limited by the installation

71. Id. art. 6, at 739-40.
72. Id. art. 7, at 740.
73. Id. art. 8, at 740-41.
74. Id. art. 9, at 741.
75. See supra note 14.
76. Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, May 25, 1962, reprintedin
57 Am. J. Int'l L. 268 (1963).
77. Id. art. 2., at 269.
78. Id. art. 3, at 270.
79. Id. art. 10(1), at 272; see Konz, The 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators
of Nuclear Ships, 57 Am. J. Intl L. 100 (1963).
80. Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963, 1063
U.N.T.S. 265, 2 IL.M. 727.
81. Id. art. IV(), at 269, 2 I.L.M. at 733.
82. Id. art. IV(2), (3), at 268-69, 2 I.L.M. at 730-33.
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state" and if the insurance or other financial security of the operator is
inadequate to satisfy claims, the installation state has to ensure payment.8' With certain exceptions,8s jurisdiction over claims lies with the
courts of the contracting party within whose territory the damage-causing
nuclear incident occurred."
A little earlier, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) countries concluded an agreement establishing on
a regional basis a similar scheme of compensation for nuclear damage. '
The operator is strictly liable for damage caused by an incident involving
either nuclear fuel or radioactive products or waste in, or nuclear
substances coming from, a nuclear installation. ' The operator must
maintain insurance or other financial security of the prescribed amount
and of such type and terms as the public authority shall specify."
Jurisdiction over claims for compensation lies only with the courts of the
contracting party in whose territory the nuclear incident occurred.
STATE LIABILITY
An absence in conventions of provisions spelling out state
liability for damage to the environment does not mean that such liability
does not exist. Rather it means that state liability and its scope must be
sought in the cumulative effect of obligations assumed directly or
indirectly by states. Thus, the Nuclear Damage Convention of 196391
charges the installation state with the duty to ensure that there are
sufficient funds to satisfy claims against operators of nuclear installations.
The 1986 Nuclear Assistance Convention'e attempts to mitigate the

83. Id. art. V, at 270, 2 I.L.M. at 735.
84. Id. art. VII, at 271-72,2 I.L.M. at 737.
85. Id. art. XI(2), (3), at 272-73, 2 I.LM. at 739.
86. Id. art. XI(l), at 272, 2 I.L.M. at 739.
87. Paris Convention on Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29,
1960, reprinted in International Atomic Energy Agency, Legal Series No. 4, International
Conventions on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage 21 (1976) (modified by the Additional
Protocol, Jan. 28, 1964).
88. Id. art. 3, at 22-23.
89. Id. art. 10, at 28-29.
90. Id. art. 13, at 29.
91. The Nuclear Damage Convention provides that.
The Installation State shall ensure the payment of claims for compensation
for nuclear damage which have been established against the operator by
providing the necessary funds to the extent that the yield of insurance or
other financial security is inadequate to satisfy such claims ....
Supra note 80, at 271, 2 LLM. at 737.

92. Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency, Oct. 29, 1986, art. 1, 25 I.L.M. 1377, 1377.
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consequences of any kind of nuclear damage by imposing on parties the
duty to cooperate between themselves and the International Atomic
Energy Agency in facilitating prompt assistance in the event of a nuclear
accident or radiological emergency, including assistance to protect the
environment. The 1962 Convention on Nuclear Ships'3 requires each
contracting state to take all measures necessary to prevent a nuclear ship
flying its flag from being operated without that state's license or
authority. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas 4 obligates flag
states to ensure that their ships comply with international safety
standards and regulations, and charges states generally with drawing up
regulations for the prevention of ocean pollution. 95
The duties of flag states are elaborated in more detail in the 1982
Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention."8 LOS also establishes a general
obligation on the part of states to protect and preserve the marine
environment.' It charges them with formulating international rules and
standards to that end," and devotes a whole section to details of these
rules and standards." Thus, states are required to control pollution from
land-based sources,"° from seabed activities under their jurisdiction, 1
from dumping,"° from vessels,"°u and from or through the atmosphere. 4 Regional seas conventions, such as the Barcelona Convention
for the Protection of the Mediterranean,"' or the Convention for the
Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the Wider
Caribbean Region,"° also impose obligations to protect and preserve the
marine environment. Both conventions require parties to formulate
procedures to determine liability and compensation for damage from
pollution of the marine environment."7 In the 1972 (London) Conven-

93. Supra note 76, art. XV, at 275.
94. Supra note 47, Annex II, art. 10(2), at 2316.
95. Supra note 47, Annex II, art. 24, at 2319.
96. LOS Convention, supra note 49, art. 94, at 1287-88.
97. LOS Convention, supra note 49, art. 192, at 1308.
98. LOS Convention, supra note 49, art. 197, at 1308.
99. LOS Convention, supra note 49, Part XII, Section 5, at 1310-11.
100. LOS Convention, supra note 49, art. 207, at 1310.
101. LOS Convention, supra note 49, art. 208, at 1310.
102. LOS Convention, supra note 49, art. 210, at 1310.
103. LOS Convention, supra note 49, art. 211, at 1310-11.
104. LOS Convention, supra note 49, art. 212, at 1311.
105. Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, Feb. 16,
1976, arts. 6-11, 15 I.L.M. 290, 291-92 [hereinafter Barcelona Convention).
106. Convention for the Protection and Development of the Marine Environment of the
Wider Caribbean Region, Mar. 24, 1983, arts. 5-8, 22 I.L.M. 227, 229 [hereinafter Wider
Caribbean Convention].
107. Barcelona Convention, supra note 105, art. 12, at 293; Wider Caribbean Convention,
supra note 106, art. 14, at 231.
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tion on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, t° parties undertake to promote the effective control of all
sources of pollution of the marine environment and pledge to take all
practicable steps to prevent the pollution of the sea by dumping."r
They must prohibit the dumping of certain enumerated substances
altogether and see to it that other mAterial is dumped only under a
general permit."0 Each party undertakes to punish contravention."'
Some activities are considered so dangerous and destructive that
they are altogether prohibited, or prohibited in certain regions. The
Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971112 forbids the emplacement of
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean
floor and subsoil thereof."' The 1963 Nuclear Test Ban treaty" 4 bans
tests under water, in the atmosphere, and in outer space" s By the
Outer Space Treaty of 196716 parties undertook not to place in orbit
around the earth any objects carrying nuclear or other weapons of mass
destruction, and not to install such weapons on celestial bodies or station
them in outer space in any other manner." 7 Here, exceptionally, states
parties explicitly assume liability for national activities in outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies (whether such activities are
carried on by government agencies or non-governmental entities), and for
assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with the
provisions set forth in the treaty." 8 This liability is clearly stated and
elaborated in the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects,'" according to which a launching state is
108. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter (London Dumping Convention), Dec. 29, 1972,26 US.T. 2403, 11 I.L.M. 1291.
109. Id. art. 1, at 2406, 11 I.L.M. at 1295.
110. Id. art. 4, at 2408, 11 I.L.M.. at 1297.
111. Id. art. 7(2), at 2410, 11 I.L.M. at 1300-01; see also Convention for the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft (Oslo Convention), Feb. 15,1972, 11
I.L.M. 262.
112. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other

Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof
(Seabed Arms Control Treaty), Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, 10 I.L.M. 146.
113. Id. art. 1, at 704, 10 I.L.M. at 146-47.
114. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 2 LL.M. 889 [hereinafter Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty).
115. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, supra note 114, art. I, at 1316-17, 2 I.L.M. at 887.
116. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use

of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), Jan.
27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
117. Id. art. IV, at 2411-12, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208.
- 118. Id. art. VI, at 2411, 610 U.N.TS. at 208; see also Agreement Governing the Activities
of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Dec. 5, 1979, arts. 3, 14, 18 I.L.M. 1434.
119. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Nov. 29,

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 34

absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space
object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight.'" However,
when damage is caused to a space vehicle outside the surface of the
earth, the launching state is liable only if the damage was due to its fault
or the fault of persons for whom it is responsible.12
In the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution,"U states merely endeavor to limit and, as far as possible, gradually
reduce and prevent air pollution, including long-range transboundary air
pollution.' This is a more cautious formulation than that, for example,
with respect to pollution of the marine environment in the LOS Convention." Nevertheless, parties do undertake to use the best available
technology which is economically feasible for control purposes." In the
1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,"
parties agree to cooperate in legal, scientific and technological fields,2"
and to take appropriate measures to protect human health and the
environment from the adverse effects of human activities which modify
or are likely to modify the ozone layer." The Montreal Protocol is
considerably more specific, in that the parties have agreed on a timetable
and percentages for the reduction of ozone-depleting substances. 2
That states have the duty to control pollution of and through
watercourses is assumed by a number of international organizations. For
example, the Helsinki Rules of the International Law Association make
a distinction between new forms of water pollution, which must be
prevented, and existing pollution, which should be abated by all
reasonable measures.'" Both obligations are somewhat weakened by the
1971, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 10 LL.M. 965.
120. Id. art. 2, at 2392, 10 LL.M. at 966.
121. Id. art. 3, at 2392, 10 I.L.M. at 966.
122. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 34 U.S.T.
3041, 18 I.L.M. 1442.
123. Id. art. 2, at 3046, 18 I.L.M. at 1443.
124. See LOS Convention, supra note 49, art. 212, at 1311.
125. Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Convention, supranote 122, art. 6, at 3047,
18 I.L.M. at 1444.
126. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M.
1516.
127. Id. art. 4, at 1530-31.
128. Id. art. 2, at 1529-30.
129. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, art.
2,26 I.L.M. 1541,1552-54. The Protocol is being periodically amended as to target dates and
amounts and control measures have been considerably tightened. See Gehring & Oberthur,
The CopenhagenMeeting, 23 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 6 (1993) on the Fourth Meeting of the Parties
to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, held at Copenhagen,
Nov. 23-25,1992. See also Rowlands, The FourthMeeting of the Partiesto the Montreal Protocol:
Report and Reflection (Special Report), 35 Envt 25 (1993).
130. International Law Association, Report of the Fifty-Second Conference, Helsinki Rules
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fact that they do not apply when pollution is consistent with the principle
of equitable utilization. 31 They were repeated in the ILA Rules on
Water Pollution in an International Drainage Basin, which were intended
to elaborate the Helsinki Rules on this topic.132 The duty not to cause
damage to other states through watercourse pollution is included in the
Athens Resolution of the International Law Institute, 13 and an Economic Commission for Europe task force recently endorsed such a duty
explicitly for transboundary water pollution."
The International Law Commission's Draft Articles on the Law
of the Nonnavigational Uses of International Watercourses, 3 5 contains
the obligation, stated unequivocally, that:
Watercourse states shall, individually or jointly, prevent,
reduce and control pollution of an international watercourse
(system) that may cause appreciable harm to other watercourse States or to their environent .... 136
The Commission strongly proclaimed also that:
Watercourse states shall, individually or jointly, take all
measures with respect to an international watercourse (system)
that are necessary to protect and preserve the marine environment, including estuaries, taking into account generally
accepted rules and standards.'
This survey of obligations assumed by states in conventions and the
restatements of the law by international bodies of experts strongly
supports the view that there exists a general obligation for all states to
ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control do not cause
substantial damage to the environment of other states and the com-

on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, art. 10, at 477, 496-97 (1967).
131. Id. at 499 (comment to art. 10).
132. International Law Association, Water Pollution in an International Drainage Basin,
Report of the Sixtieth Conference, art. 1, at 115 (1982).
133. Resolutions Adopted at the Athens Session, Sept. 4-13, 1979, Res. I, The Pollution
of Rivers and Lakes and International Law, art. 2,58 Y.B. Inst. Int'l L. pt. 1, at 199 (1979).
134. U.N. Economic Commission for Europe, FinalReport of the Task Forceon Responsibility

and Liability Regarding TransboundaryWater Pollution,Guidelines,at 20, U.N. Doc. ENVWA/R.

45 (1990).
135. U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. 10, DraftArticles on the Law of the Non-navigationalUses
of InternationalWatercourses, provisionallyadopted by the Commission, Report of the International
law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, 29 Apr.-19 July 1991, at 152, U.N. Doc.

A/45/10 (1990).
136. Id. art. 21, para. 2.
137. Id. art. 23.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol 34

mons.'1 This theory would base state liability on fault, and yet there is
a lot in favor of strict liability as a general rule of international law. It is
simple and certain. All that is required to trigger it is evidence of
substantial transboundary damage and no questions asked as to whether
there had been an infringement of specific international obligations. In
this respect, it should have considerable deterrent effect on the behavior
of states. It has won numerous adherents, at least for ultra-hazardous
activities, among academic writers'" and members of the International
Law Commission. 4° But the Commission remains divided on the
topic'41 and Quentin-Baxter, its First Special Rapporteur on international
liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by
international law, limited the application of strict liability to conventional
regimes or to instances when the building of a conventional regime failed
or injury was unforeseen.' A change in the special rapporteurs

138. See Dupuy, The InternationalLaw of State Responsibility: Revolution or Evolution?, 11
Mich. J.Int'l L. 105, 114 (1989); Handl, Liabilityas an Obligation Establishedby a PrimaryRule
of InternationalLaw, 16-Neth. Y.B. Int'l L 49,59 (1985). The Rio Declaration on Environment
and Development of 1992 proclaims that states have "responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states
or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction." U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992, Rio Declarationon Environment and Development,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5, reprinted in 22 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 268 (1992). This is a repetition
of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration, Principle 21. U.N., General Assembly, Report of the United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 LL.M. 1416.
139. See, e.g., Jenks, Liabilityfor Ultra-Hazardous Activities in InternationalLaw, 117 Recueil
des Cours 105, 194 (1966-I); Goldie, Liability for Damage and the Progressive Development of
InternationalLaw, 14 Int'l &Comp. L.Q. 1189 (1985); Kelson, State Responsibilityand the Abnormally Dangerous Activity, 13 Harv. Int'l L.J. 197, 243 (1972); Hardy, Nuclear Liability: The
General Principlesof Law and Further Proposals, 1960 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L 223, 237; Weiss, Who
Pays for Weather Modification Damage?, 4 Envtl Pol'y & L 22, 23 (1978); Gaines, International
Principlesfor TransnationalEnvironmental Liability: Can Developments in Municipal Law Help
Break the Impasse?, 30 Harv. Int'l L.J. 311, 316-17, 348 (1989).
140. See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-Ninth Session,
42 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 10, at 112, U.N. Doc. A/42/10 (1987) in which it was reported
that, while discussing international liability for injurious acts not prohibited by international
law, some members disagreed with the assertion that the concept of strict liability did not
exist in international law, pointing out that:
It was incorporated, as a concept if not as a term, in a number of
multilateral treaties. The principle was recognized in the Trail Smelter
arbitration, the Gut Dam Claims,and in many other forms of State practice
referred to in the Secretariat study on the topic. Strict liability was the basis
on which a solution to the fundamental problems under this topic should
be approached.
Id. at 112 (citations omitted).
141. See, e.g., id. at 111.
142. In his Third Report, Special Rapporteur Quentin-Baxter states that.
There can be no doubt at all that strict liability is a very important and
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brought no change in the attitude toward strict liability." 3 In his Sixth
Report, Second Special Rapporteur Barboza submitted 33 draft articles on
the same topic, in which he advocates negotiations to determine
reparation.1" But vestiges of strict liability linger in his insistence that
injury must be compensated." It would seem that the ghost of strict
liability is hard to exorcise entirely.
TOWARD AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE THREAT
OF ECOCIDE
The aim of any measures for protection of the environment
should be to prevent damage and to repair damage once it has occurred.
Penal measures and liability, especially strict liability providing for
sufficiently high compensation, ought to be part of all environmental
protection programs. However, where there exists a realistic threat of
ecocide on a global scale, the only adequate response may be prohibition,
as in the 1963 Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.*
In the case of activities which are part of economically beneficial
processes, prohibition may be politically and economically impractical.
So, having downplayed strict liability, Quentin-Baxter, the International
Law Commission's First Special Rapporteur on International Liability for
Injurious consequences Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, strove to emphasize prevention by exhorting states to keep
channels of communication open, as befits an age of communication. 47

frequent ingredient in the construction of conventional regimes ..... It is
equally clear that no automatic commitment to a strict liability standard
would be generally acceptable ....
Quentin-Baxter, Third Report on InternationalLiabilityfor Injurious Consequences Arising Out
of Acts Not Prohibitedby InternationalLaw, 1982 11 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, pt. 1, para. 20, at 56.
But he finds a place for strict liability when all "soft law" measures for building preventive
regimes have been exhausted:
At the very end of the day, when all the opportunities of regime building
have been set aside--or, alternatively, when a loss or injury has occurred
that nobody foresaw-there is a commitment, in the nature of strict
liability, to make good the loss.
Id. at 60, para. 41.
143. Barboza, Second Report on InternationalLiabilityfor Injurious Consequences Arising Out
of Acts Not Prohibitedby InternationalLaw, 1986 I Y.B. Int'l L Comm'n pt. 1, paras. 51, 52, at
145, 156-57.
144. Art. 21 of the Draft Articles submitted by Second Special Rapporteur Barboza in his
Sixth Report. See Barboza, Sixth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences
Arising Out of Acts Not Prohibitedby InternationalLaw, at 48, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/428 (1990).
145. Id.
146. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, supra note 114, art. I, at 1316-17, 2 I.L.M. at 889.
147. See supra note 142, para. 53, at 62.
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This would be achieved by the "soft" duty or law of information,"
including cooperation in providing it, and by negotiation.14' These
duties, though allowing no right of action when transgressed," would
induce states to institute preventive regimes or measures jointly or
unilaterally. 5 ' Problems of compensation would come after injury
occurred and would be a matter for negotiation in the light of shared
expectations and balancing of interests.' s2 Second Special Rapporteur
Barboza continued the soft-law approach,ls though he seems to have
been aware of its doubtful value for prevention.' However, he was
also aware that changing soft into hard law would bring the topic
(liability for injury from acts not prohibited by international law) into the
ambit of responsibility for the consequences of wrongful acts."5 ' This
may be the direction in which the practice of states is leading any15
way. '
Whereas soft law would do little to make prevention work,
elevating the consequences of some activities to the level of an international crime may make it at least more plausible. This is what the
International Law Commission has done. It identified as an international
crime the violation of "an obligation of, essential importance for the
preservation of the human environment, such as those prohibiting
massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas."' 7 The definition is

148. Id. at 62-63.
149. Id. at 63.
150. Id. at 63.
151. Id.

152. Id. at 63-64.
153. See Draft Articles in the Annex to the Second Special Rapporteur's Sixth Report
(Barboza, supra note 144, at 39); art. 7 (cooperation); art. 8 (prevention); art. 11 (assessment,
notification and information); art. 14 (consultation); and art. 18 (failure to comply with the

foregoing obligations shall not constitute grounds for affected states to institute proceedings). See also Barboza Eighth Report, in which he recommends consigning obligations for
prevention to an annex and treating them as purely recommendatory provisions. Barboza,
Eighth Report on International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising Out of Acts Not
Prohibited by International Law, Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its
Forty-FourthSession, 4 May - 24 July 1992, at 8-9, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/443 (1992). For the
discussion of Special Rapporteur Barboza's Eighth Report, see Report of the InternationalLaw
Commission on the Work of Its Forty-FourthSession, 4 May - 24 July 1992, U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 100-29, U.N. Doc. A/47/10 (1992) (note specifically the prevention
discussion at 100-29).
154. Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Second Session, I May
-20 July 1990, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at para. 502, at 267, U.N. Doc. A/45/10

(1990).
155.
156.
157.
IIY.B.

Id. para. 504, at 268.
See supra note 138.
Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Twenty-Eighth Session, 1976
Int'l L. Comm'n pt. 2, para. 26, at 95.
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not free of ambiguity, but the essence of the examples given is that an
international crime may be committed by massive pollution of the environment. Such pollution in itself is a violation of an obligation essential
for the preservation of the human environment, and there is no need to
point to specifically articulated and clearly accepted obligations, such as
not to detonate nuclear devices in the atmosphere."3 It is the massiveness of the destruction which transforms impairment of the environment
(i.e., pollution) into a crime and distinguishes it from a delict. There is
considerable evidence, as stated above,'" that states have an obligation
not to impair the environment. If so, then impairment at a certain level
(substantial) constitutes a delict, and when the impairment is above that
level states commit an international crime.
The idea of state international crime met with opposition from a
number of states and remains controversial."W It has been suggested,
therefore, that the opposition might lessen if no state acts were branded
with the stigma of crime and only some acts would entail more severe
consequences. 161 This may be especially appropriate for ecocide, since
environmental international crime was specifically singled out by some
states.11 Ecocide could be considered as an aggravated tort or delict,
instead of as a crime. Such a supertort would still be an offense ergq
omnes,16 and all states should not only have standing to bring charges

158. Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, supra note 114.
159. See supra note 138; see also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 601 (1986).

160. See Spinedi, International Crimes of State: The Legislative History, in International
Crimes of State: A Critical Analysis of the lWs Draft Article 19 on State Responsibility 7,
45-50 (Weiler et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter International Crimes of State Analysis].

161. See Dupuy, Implications of Institutionalization of International Crimes of States, in
International Crimes of State Analysis, supra note 160, at 170, 184; see also Graefrath,

Responsibility and Damages Caused: Relationship Between Responsibility and Damages, 185
Recueil des Cours 9, 8-61 (1984-I1); Spinedi, supra note 160, at 52-54.
162. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany, see 1981 II Y.B. Int'l L Comm'n pt.
1, at 75; see also Spinedi, supra note 160, at 61.
163. On the extensive discussion of whether international crimes are offenses erga omnes
and whether only states directly affected could bring action, see Spinedi, supra note 160, at
136-38. Riphagen, the International Law Commission's Special Rapporteur on State
Responsibility, held that when a state commits an international crime, all other states are
injured. See Riphagen, Fifth Report on State Responsibility, 1984 II Y.B. Int'l L Comm'n, pt.
1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/380. On the states that agreed with him, see Spinedi, supra note
160, at 72. Earlier, in his Fourth Report, Special Rapporteur Riphagen maintained that the
erga omnes character of the breach is a common element of all international crimes.
Riphagen, Fourth Report on State Responsibility, 1983 11 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, pt 1, paras. 58,
59, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/366.
After reviewing the declarations of the International Court of Justice, United
Nations organs and expert bodies, Schachter concluded that he sees "distinct advantages"
in applying the concept of obligations erga omnes to the limited category of principles
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in appropriate tribunals,'" but should also be permitted to take countermeasures short of use of force (unless the offense amounted to an
aggressive use of force)."
To make prosecution more effective,
standing to sue should be given to international organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).'"
CONCLUSIONS
Incidents of ecocide and the threat of more and worse to come
have steadily increased since the middle of the present century.167 The
response of the international community has been two-pronged:
providing and tightening liability, and searching for preventive measures.
Liability is channeled through operators of risky, damage-causing
enterprises, 16 while states have endeavored to minimize their responsi-

mentioned by the Court and the International Law Commission. Schachter, General Course
in Public InternationalLaw, 178 Recueil des Cours 21, 201 (1982-V). Schwelb, reviewing the
South West Africa Cases, came to the conclusion that "an equivalent to an actio popularis
was, indeed, 'known' to international law in 1919/20, in 1962 and in 1966, and is 'known'
today." Schwelb, The Actio Popularisand InternationalLow, 2 Israel Y.B. on Human Rights 46,
55 (1972).
164. The appropriate international tribunal could be the international criminal court under
discussion in the International Law Commission. See Draft Code of
Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in Report of the InternationalLaw Commission
on the Work of Its Forty-Second Session, supra note 154, ch. I. For further progress on this
subject, see Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of Its Forty-FourthSession,
4 May - 24 July, 1992, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 10, Annex, para. 396, U.N. Doc.
A/47/10 (Report of the Working Group on the Question of an International Criminal
Jurisdiction).
A special environmental tribunal could be created for that purpose, as suggested
in the Final Recommendation of the Congress on a More Efficient International Law on the
Environment and Setting Up an International Court for the Environment Within the United
Nations System, Rome, Apr. 21-24,1989, reprinted in Postiglione, A More Efficient International
Law on the Environment Within the United Nations, 20 Envtl. L.321, 327 (1990) [hereinafter
Postiglione-Efficient]; see also Postiglione, An InternationalCourt for the Environment?, 23
Envtl. Pol'y & L.73 (1993) [hereinafter Postiglione-Court.
165. For similar views, see Riphagen, Fifth Report to the InternationalLaw Commission, 1984
II Y.B. Int'l L.Comm'n, Pt. 1, at 2-4, U.N. Doc. A/CNA/380-4-9.
166. After reviewing the expanding role of NGOs in protecting the environment, Sands
argues for the need to accord them standing for that purpose on an international plane.
Sands, The Environment, Community and International Law, 30 Harv. Int'l L. J. 393, 412-17
(1989). The Congress on a More Efficient International Law on the Environment would grant
this right to private individuals. See Postiglione-Efficient, supranote 164, at 327; PostiglioneCourt, supra note 164, para. h, at 78; see also supra note 164, paras. 62-63, at 22.
167. For examples of ecocide in the second half of the 20th century, see supra notes 14-32
and accompanying text. Official and unofficial preoccupation with the threat of climate
change is one of the indicators of growing awareness of the potential for ecocide on a global
scale.
168. See supra notes 53-64, 75-90, and accompanying text.
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bility-cum-liability.10 Because liability comes into play only after
damage, perhaps irretrievable, has been done, it was hoped to induce
states to act before disaster occurred, by adopting and following
preventive measures. Reliance here was on strengthening communication
among states in order to create liability regimes voluntarily.170 At the
same time, the concept of international environmental crime began to
gain ground."' If accepted, this concept of criminal responsibility, or its
equivalent under a different name, would strengthen prevention and,
perhaps, would speed up the movement toward strengthening enforcement, which remains weak. The U.N. Security Council is empowered to
issue recommendations for the settling of disputes affecting peace and
security," as well as binding decisions backed by military and nonmilitary sanctions when peace has been broken, or such breach threatens.173 It could act effectively in environmental matters if its powers
were extended to identifying actual or potential cases of ecocide and
giving binding orders backed by sanctions, but it would have to be
unhampered by the veto if it were not7 to repeat the impotence it has
exhibited in the maintenance of peace.1 4
There are proposals to either revamp the Security Council," or
create an entirely new body with similar competence, but confined to
environmental matters. 6 Proposals which rely on expanding the
competence of existing organizations may have an edge."" But how
effective would an enhancement of powers of existing international
bodies be, given such attitudes as an official United States finding that
169. For example, the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution states:
"The present convention does not contain rules on liability as to damage." Convention on
Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, supra note 122, art. 8(f), at 3048,18 I.L.M. at 1445.
170. See supra, notes 147-152 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
172. U.N. Charter, arts. 34, 36.
173. U.N. Charter arts. 39, 41, 42.
174. U.N. Charter art. 27. Veto means that no binding (valid) decision can be made by the
U.N. Security Council as against a negative vote of one of the permanent members of the

Council.
175. See the British proposal at the U.N. ECOSOC meeting of May 8-10, 1989, summarized in [Current Rep.) Int'l Envtl. Rptr. (BNA) 281-82 (1989); U.N., G.A. Res., On Protection

of Global Climatefor Presentand FutureGenerationsof Mankind,U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/53 (Dec.
6, 1988), reprinted in 28 I.LM. 1326. See also the comments of the representative of Malta
to the United Nations on the need for general representation on a body enforcing
environmental decisions and the problem of the veto of the big powers, reported in [Current
Rep.] 12 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 341-42 (1989).
176. On institutional reorganization within the U.N., see e.g., Declaration of The Hague,
Mar. 11, 1989, reprinted in Sands, supra note 166, at 417, 419.
177. At the U.N. ECOSOC meeting of May 8-10,1989, the British Permanent Representative to the United Nations warned that time does not allow us the luxury of creating new
institutions. See supra, note 175.
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the existing international dispute resolution system is adequate for the
purpose, or the United Kingdom's unwillingness to extend more than
recommended powers of the Security Council to environmental matterss An effective international regime is an essential prerequisite to
a world free of the fear of ecocide, but, if and when it is installed, it may
give no more than a breathing space unless it is built upon a reconciliation of the twin needs for economic development and environmental
preservation.

178. See the United States' paper in response to UNEPs request for U.N. members' views
on the structure and responsiveness of the U.N. in dealing with major environmental issues.
Improving U.N. Institutional Involvement in Environmental Affairs: Enhancing Central
Coordinationand Role of UNEP, reprinted in 21 Envtl. Pol'y & L. 47 (1991); see also supra note
175.

